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Abstract
We examine whether and to what extent consolidation in the US health insurance industry has contributed to
higher employer-sponsored insurance premiums. We exploit the differential impact across local markets of a
national merger of two insurers to identify the causal effect of concentration on premiums. Using data for large
groups, we estimate premiums in average markets were approximately seven percentage points higher by 2007
due to increases in local concentration from 1998-2006. We also find evidence consolidation facilitates the
exercise of monopsonistic power vis-Ã -vis physicians, leading to reductions in their absolute employment
and earnings relative to other healthcare workers
Disciplines
Insurance
This journal article is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/hcmg_papers/75
American Economic Review 2012, 102(2): 1161–1185
http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.102.2.1161
1161
Although the majority of health-care spending in the United States is funneled 
through the private health insurance industry, few researchers have examined 
whether the industry itself is contributing to rising health insurance premiums. This 
possibility has become ever more salient as consolidations continue in this highly 
concentrated sector. In 2001, the American Medical Association (AMA) reported 
nearly half of the 40 largest Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) were “highly 
concentrated,” as defined by the Horizontal Merger Guidelines issued in 1997 by 
the US Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission. In 2008, the AMA 
expanded its annual report to include 314 geographic areas (mainly MSAs), 94 per-
cent of which were found to be highly concentrated.1 During this seven-year period, 
the average, inflation-adjusted premium for employer-sponsored family coverage 
rose 48 percent (to $12,680 in 2008)2 while real median household income declined 
by 2 percent to $50,303 (DeNavas-Walt, Proctor, and Smith 2009).
Prior studies point to the potential for insurer consolidation to raise pre-
miums (e.g., Robinson 2004; Wholey, Feldman, and Christianson 1995; and 
1 “Competition in Health Insurance: A Comprehensive Study of US Markets,” American Medical Association, 
2001 and 2008. These figures are based on the reported levels of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for HMOs 
and PPOs combined. Estimates are not strictly comparable over time due to changes in methodology and sample 
selection. For example, self-insured HMOs are generally included in 2001 but excluded in 2008. The Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines issued in 1992 and updated in 1997 define markets with HHI > 1,800 as “highly concentrated.” 
A recent update adjusted this threshold to 2,500 (DOJ 2010), and as a result the share of markets in 2008 that would 
be highly concentrated is somewhat lower at 70 percent.
2 The corresponding increase for single coverage was 44 percent (Kaiser Family Foundation/Health Research 
and Educational Trust Employer Health Benefits Annual Survey 2009). Premiums include both employer and 
employee contributions, and are adjusted to 2008 dollars by the authors using the CPI-U.
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Dafny 2010); however, none attempts to quantify this effect.3 From a theoretical 
standpoint, the effect of concentration on insurance premiums is ambiguous. On one 
hand, increases in market concentration may allow health insurers to raise their mark-
ups, leading to higher premiums. On the other hand, increases in market concentration 
may strengthen insurers’ bargaining positions vis-à-vis health-care providers, lead-
ing to reduced negotiated reimbursements and lower premiums. In addition, there are 
many potential sources of efficiency gains from consolidation, including economies 
of scale in investments in information technologies (IT) investing and disease man-
agement programs. Such efficiency gains would reduce optimal premiums.4 The net 
effect on insurance premiums is ultimately an empirical question.
There are two key challenges to empirically estimating such a link: (i) adequate 
data and (ii) plausibly exogenous variation in market concentration. Regarding 
the first issue, comprehensive data on a large sample of health plans are extremely 
difficult to obtain because contracts are customized for each buyer across many 
dimensions, renegotiated annually, and considered highly confidential. In addition, 
premiums vary based on the demographics, health risks, and expenditure history of 
the insured population. Thus, it is difficult to calculate a standardized premium to 
enable comparisons across employers and/or markets. With respect to the second 
challenge, highly concentrated markets (or markets that are becoming more con-
centrated) are likely to differ from other markets in unobservable ways, making it 
difficult to separately identify the effect of concentration from other factors.
We address these challenges as follows. First, we utilize detailed longitudinal data 
on the health plans offered by a sample of more than 800 employers in 139 distinct 
geographic markets in the United States. The data span the nine years between 1998 
and 2006 and represent approximately 10 million active employees and their depen-
dents in each year. Rather than attempting to standardize premiums across different 
employee populations, products, and plan designs, we focus on the growth rate of 
health insurance premiums for the same employer in a specific geographic market 
over time and examine how this relates to the local market structure of health insur-
ers. Focusing on growth alleviates concerns about time-invariant unobservable dif-
ferences in the risk profiles of employee groups and the characteristics of plans they 
utilize that may be correlated with premium levels. We also control for the influence 
of time-varying measures such as employee demographics, the types of plans uti-
lized (HMO, PPO, etc.), and the generosity of benefit design.
After documenting trends in the level and growth of concentration (as measured 
by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI), which is the sum of squared market 
shares) in 139 distinct geographic markets, we estimate OLS models of the relation-
ship between premium growth and concentration levels. We do not find evidence 
3 Robinson (2004) shows that state-level insurance markets are dominated by a small number of firms and 
observes that insurer profits increased rapidly over 2000–2003. Wholey, Feldman, and Christianson (1995) report 
that premiums per HMO member are negatively related to the number of competitors facing the HMO in question, 
controlling for a host of HMO and market characteristics such as per capita income, Blue Cross affiliation and HMO 
ownership status. Last, Dafny (2010) finds health insurers engage in “direct” price discrimination, charging higher 
premiums to firms with deeper pockets, as measured by operating profits. This evidence of price discrimination 
implies insurers possess and exercise market power in some local markets but does not yield an estimate of the 
contribution of imperfect competition in this market to premium growth.
4 Of course, rent transfers from providers to insurers are not true efficiency gains, although they may reduce 
premiums.
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that premiums are rising more quickly in markets that are becoming more concen-
trated. While these estimates are useful for descriptive purposes, they are unlikely to 
provide causal estimates of the impact of market structure on premiums. Differences 
in HHI across markets—or even changes in HHI within markets—are likely to be 
driven by many factors that are not exogenous to premiums. These include differ-
ences (or changes) in consumer preferences and constraints, product offerings and 
pricing strategies, and the market conduct of hospitals, physicians, and other health-
care providers. For example, consider a market with a struggling local economy. 
In such a market, consumers may flock to low-priced carriers, bringing about an 
increase in local market concentration and a simultaneous reduction in average pre-
mium growth (relative to other markets). This pattern does not imply consolidations 
in such a market would reduce premium growth, ceteris paribus.
In order to address the endogeneity challenge and obtain a credible estimate of the 
impact of concentration on premium growth, we exploit sharp and heterogeneous 
increases in local market concentration generated by the 1999 merger of two indus-
try giants, Aetna and Prudential Healthcare. Both were national firms, active in most 
local insurance markets, and thus the merger had widespread impact. However, the 
premerger market shares of the two firms varied significantly across specific geo-
graphic markets, resulting in very different shocks to post-merger concentration. 
For example, in our sample the premerger market shares of Aetna and Prudential 
in Jacksonville, Florida were 19 and 24 percent, respectively, versus just 11 and 1 
percent, respectively, in Las Vegas, Nevada. Holding all else equal, this implies an 
increase in post-merger HHI of 892 points in Jacksonville, but only 21 points in Las 
Vegas. Focusing on the years immediately surrounding this merger, we examine 
the relationship between premium growth and HHI changes using these predicted 
changes as instruments for actual changes and controlling as fully as possible for 
changes in the characteristics of health plans (such as benefit design).
The point estimates indicate that rising concentration in local health insur-
ance markets accounts for a nontrivial share of premium growth in recent years. 
Specifically, our instrumental variables estimates imply that the mean increase in 
local market HHI between 1998 and 2006 (inclusive) raised premiums by roughly 
7 percent from their 1998 baseline, all else equal. Given private health insurance 
expenditures of $490 billion in our base year 1998, if this result is generalizable, 
then the “premium on premiums” by 2007 is on the order of $34 billion per year, or 
about $200 per person with employer-sponsored health insurance.5
Although our focus is on the exercise of market power by insurers in the output 
market, consolidation may also have important effects on input prices. Using data on 
earnings and employment of health-care personnel, we exploit the differential impact 
across geographic markets of the Aetna-Prudential merger to examine whether there 
is a causal link between concentration and these outcomes. Our analysis suggests 
that the growth in insurer bargaining power following this merger reduced earnings 
and employment growth of physicians and raised earnings and employment growth 
5 Source: National Health Expenditure Data provided by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services; avail-
able online at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/. The vast majority of this spending is due to 
employer-sponsored plans; only 9 percent of the nonelderly privately insured have policies that are not employment 
based (DeNavas-Walt, Proctor, and Smith 2009). Additionally, this figure understates the size of the private health 
insurance industry as it excludes expenditures by Medicaid and Medicare managed care plans.
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of nurses. This pattern of results is consistent with postmerger substitution of nurses 
for physicians, and the exercise of monopsony power vis-à-vis physicians.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I describes the data in detail. We exam-
ine the association between local market concentration and premium growth in 
Section II. In Section III we investigate whether a causal relationship exists between 
these two variables using the variation across geographic markets in the merger-
induced increase in insurer concentration. Section IV contains our analyses of the 
relationship between concentration and health-care employment and earnings. 
Section V concludes.
I.  Data
Our primary source is the Large Employer Health Insurance Dataset (LEHID). 
LEHID contains information on all of the health plans offered by a large sample of 
employers between 1998 and 2006, inclusive. It is an unbalanced panel gathered 
and maintained by a leading benefits consulting firm. The data are proprietary, and 
employers included in the dataset have some past or present affiliation with the firm. 
Online Appendix 1, which contains additional details of the data not presented here, 
illustrates that LEHID plans are on average very similar to the plans offered by a 
representative sample of large employers nationwide.
The original unit of observation is the health plan–year. A health plan is defined 
as a unique combination of employer, market, insurance type, insurance carrier, and 
plan type (e.g., Company X’s Chicago-area fully insured Aetna HMO). There are 
813 unique employers, 139 geographic markets, two insurance types (self- and fully 
insured), 357 insurance carriers6 and four plan types (HMO, POS, PPO, Indemnity) 
represented in the data.7 Most employers in LEHID are large, multisite, publicly 
traded firms, such as those appearing on the fortune 1000 list. The leading industries 
represented include manufacturing (110 employers), finance (101), and consumer 
products (73), although nonprofit and government sectors are also represented (43 in 
the “government/education” category). Geographic markets are defined by the data 
source using three-digit zip codes. According to the data provider, the 139 markets 
reflect the geographic boundaries typically used by insurance carriers when quoting 
prices. Large metropolitan areas are separate markets, and nonmetropolitan areas 
are lumped together within state boundaries (e.g., “New Mexico—Albuquerque” 
and “New Mexico—except Albuquerque”).8
The sample includes both fully insured and self-insured plans. As these terms 
suggest, the former is “traditional” insurance in which the insured pays the carrier 
to bear the risk of realized health-care outlays. Many large employers choose to 
self-insure, outsourcing benefits management, provider contracting, and/or claims 
6 Many of these carriers are third-party administrators, who “rent” provider networks and process claims for 
self-insured employers.
7 HMO and POS plans control utilization through primary care physicians (“gatekeepers”). HMOs cover only 
in-network providers, while POS and PPO plans provide some coverage for out-of-network providers. Indemnity 
plans have no gatekeepers or network restrictions.
8 There is only one market that crosses state boundaries, “Massachusetts—Southern and Rhode Island.” A few 
rural areas of the United States are excluded. A map of the markets is available in Dafny (2010).
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administration but paying the realized costs of care. The percent of LEHID enrollees 
in self-insured plans increased from 55 to 80 percent during the study period.
In addition to the elements that jointly define a plan, our dataset includes the fol-
lowing variables: premium, demographic factor, plan design factor, and number of 
enrollees. Premium is expressed as an average amount per enrollee (i.e., a covered 
employee); it therefore increases with the average family size of enrollees in a given 
plan. Premium combines employer and employee contributions, and for self-insured 
plans it is a projection of expected costs per enrollee (including estimated adminis-
trative fees paid to an insurance carrier, as well as premiums for stop-loss insurance, 
if any). Because the forecasts are used for budgeting and to establish employee pre-
mium contributions, they are carefully developed and vetted. Employers often hire 
outside actuaries and benefits experts (such as our source) to assist in formulating 
accurate projections.
Demographic factor is a measure that reflects family size, age, and gender com-
position of enrollees in a given plan. All of these characteristics are important deter-
minants of average expected costs per enrollee in a plan. Plan design factor captures 
the generosity of benefits within a particular carrier–plan type, with an emphasis on 
the levels of coinsurance, copayments, and deductibles. Both factors are calculated 
by the source, and the proprietary formulae were not disclosed to us. Higher values 
of either factor are associated with higher premiums.
The LEHID also records the number of enrollees in each plan. This figure 
includes only employees of the relevant firm; dependents are accounted for by the 
demographic factor described above. The total number of enrollees in all LEHID 
plans averages 4.7 million per year. Given an average family size of more than 
two, this implies that more than ten million US residents are part of the sample 
in a typical year, representing approximately 7 percent of those with employer-
sponsored insurance (ESI) during this period, and a much larger share of those 
insured through large firms.
We supplement the LEHID data with time-varying measures of local economic 
conditions (the unemployment rate, as reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics), 
a measure of health-care utilization (Medicare costs per capita, as reported by 
the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid services), and the concentration of the 
hospital industry (HHI as calculated by the authors using the Annual Surveys of 
Hospitals administered by the American Hospital Association).9 As the first two 
measures are reported at the county-year level, and LEHID markets are defined by 
three-digit zip codes, we make use of a mapping between zip codes and counties 
and, where necessary, use population data to calculate weighted average values for 
each LEHID market and year.
We perform most analyses using data aggregated to the employer-market-year 
level. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for this unit of observation for 1998, 
2002, and 2006, which represent the initial, middle, and final years of the sample 
respectively. Because our primary outcome is growth in health insurance premi-
ums (in order to avoid cross-sectional identification of the coefficients of interest), 
9 To calculate HHI for each geographic market and year, we use data on the number of beds for all general hos-
pitals located in the set of three-digit zip codes that define the market, assigning hospitals with the same “system 
ID” to a common owner.
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aggregating the data to the employer-market-year level enables us to use a much 
larger proportion of the data. With the health plan–level data, growth in premium is 
undefined when an employer terminates a particular plan. Analogously, new plans 
can enter the analysis only after multiple observations are available. Changes to plan 
offerings are quite common in our data (24 percent of plans in year t whose firm-
markets are still present in year t + 1 no longer exist). Moreover, changes in market 
concentration may affect the insurance carriers and plan types chosen by employ-
ers, so we do not want a priori to eliminate this substitution from our sample.10 
Given this aggregation, both fully and self-insured plans must be included together 
in the analysis sample to ensure the set of employees represented over time is stable 
(but for hiring, attrition, and changes in employees’ decisions to take up employer-
sponsored insurance).
II. Is Premium Growth Correlated with Local Market Concentration?
In this section, we examine the relationship between the growth in health insur-
ance premiums and local market concentration. We begin by describing the distri-
bution of market-level HHI and how this has changed over time. Next, we estimate 
OLS regressions relating premium growth at the employer-market level to the cor-
responding market HHI. We include market fixed effects in our models, so that we 
identify the coefficient of interest using changes in within-market HHI. The richness 
10 This occurs very frequently in the LEHID. For example, consider employer-market pairs that are present in 
both 1999 and 2002. More than half of the plans offered by these firms in 1999 are no longer present in 2002, either 
because the employer switched to different carriers or because it changed the type of plan with the same carrier.
Table 1—Descriptive Statistics (unit of Observation: Employer-Market-year)
1998 2002 2006
Premium ($) 4,104.47 5,624.70 7,832.46
(1,047.76) (1,280.61) (1,807.98)
Number of enrollees 399.86 370.42 361.47
(1,465.47) (1,397.66) (1,245.86)
Demographic factor 2.35 2.29 1.84
(0.47) (0.41) (0.38)
Plan design 1.05 1.05 0.98
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Plan type
 HMO 29.4% 30.6% 25.4%
 Indemnity 22.4% 7.2% 2.8%
 POS 28.1% 16.8% 14.1%
 PPO 20.0% 45.4% 57.6%
Percent fully insured 33.0% 24.2% 14.4%
Observations 10,033 14,851 11,497
Notes: All statistics are unweighted. The unit of observation is an employer-market-year com-
bination. Demographic factor reflects age, gender, and family size for enrollees. Plan design 
measures the generosity of benefits. Both are constructed by the data source and exact formu-
lae are not available. Premiums are in nominal dollars. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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of the data also permits us to control for important time-varying differences (such 
as the percent of enrollees in HMOs and the magnitude of copayments). Although 
interesting as a descriptive exercise, this analysis is unlikely to yield unbiased esti-
mates of the causal impact of changes in market structure on premium growth, as 
changes in market structure are unlikely to be exogenous.
A. Market Structure of large Group Insurance Markets, 1998–2006
During our nine-year study period, the average market-level HHI (estimated 
using our sample and scaled from 0 to 10,000) increased from 2,286 to 2,984.11 
Using the categorization from the Horizontal Merger Guidelines issued in 
1997, the fraction of markets falling into the top “highly concentrated” category 
(HHI > 1,800) rose from 68 to 99 percent. The median four-firm concentration 
ratio increased from 79 to 90 percent. Thus, our data support the conclusions 
of well-publicized reports issued by the American Medical Association and the 
General Accounting Office: local health insurance markets are concentrated and 
becoming more so over time.12
Figure 1 presents histograms of the market-level changes in HHI, separately 
for 1998–2002, 2002–2006, and 1998–2006. The larger increases tended to occur 
during the second half of the study period, but sizable increases are present in 
the first half as well. Between 1998 and 2002, 53 percent of markets experienced 
increases in HHI of 100 points or more, and 25 percent saw increases of 500 
or more points. The corresponding figures for 2002 to 2006 are 78 and 53 per-
cent, respectively. The Merger Guidelines provide a helpful frame of reference for 
interpreting these changes. According to the Guidelines, mergers resulting in an 
increase of 100 or more points when HHI already exceeds 1,800 are “presumed … 
likely to create or enhance market power or facilitate its exercise.” There is wide 
variation in the magnitude of changes in HHI across markets, notwithstanding the 
fact that most are positive.
The reasons for these changes in HHI can be subdivided into “structural” (related 
to entry, exit, and consolidation) and “nonstructural” sources. Using data on fully 
insured HMOs only, Scanlon, Chernew, Swaminathan, and Lee (2006) report that 
61 to 65 percent of the variation in HHI between 1998 and 2002 is attributable to 
structural changes. These changes are also important in our sample: the mean num-
ber of carriers per market declined from 18.9 in 1998 to 9.6 in 2006.13 Of course, 
neither source of HHI change can be presumed exogenous to other determinants of 
premium growth. Consumer preferences simultaneously determine market shares 
and premium growth, and exit and consolidation of carriers may be impacted by 
expectations of premium growth.
11 To gauge the impact of this change on concentration, consider the following two examples. A market with 
five insurers, four of which have a market share of 23.75 percent, would have an HHI of 2,281. A market with four 
insurers, three of which each have a market share of 31.33 percent, would have an HHI of 2,981.
12 AMA ibid; GAO (2009a).
13 As the data on HHI suggest, many of these carriers are quite small. This is due to the presence of many small 
self-insured plan administrators, particularly in the earlier part of the study period. Some of these administrators 
may not be active participants in a given market, i.e., they “rent networks” from other carriers so as to offer a par-
ticular client a consistent plan across all geographies.
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Figure 1. Change in Local Market Herfindahl
Note: HHI is scaled from 0 to 10,000.
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B. OlS Estimates of the Relationship between Market Structure and Premiums
To explore the relationship between premium growth and market concentration, 
we begin by estimating equations of the following form:
(1) Δ ln ( premium ) emt = α + β HH I mt−1 + ϕ  X mt−1 + ρΔ C emt +  τ t +  λ m 
 [ +  ς e ] [ + ωΔ plan type share s emt + ϑΔ plan desig n emt ]
 +  ε emt .
In this specification, we model premium growth between year t − 1 and year t for a 
given employer e in market m as a function of lagged market characteristics (including 
HHI),14 contemporaneous changes in observable characteristics of the insured popula-
tion (such as demographics), and year and market fixed effects. Market characteristics 
are lagged by one year because premiums are set prospectively, i.e., premiums for 
2006 are determined in 2005. In addition to HHI, the market-year covariates (denoted 
by  X mt−1 ) include the unemployment rate (to capture local economic conditions), the 
log of per-capita Medicare costs (to capture trends in health-care utilization), and the 
general, acute-care hospital HHI (to capture concentration in the provider market, 
which could independently lead to premium increases). Note these characteristics are 
included in level form (rather than first differences) to allow for a delayed response to 
changes in market structure or in local economic conditions.15
In contrast, we anticipate concurrent premium responses to changes in characteristics 
measured at the employer-market-year level (Δ C emt ), specifically demographic factors 
and the percentage of enrollees in self-insured plans. The year fixed effects capture 
average national changes in premium growth, and the market fixed effects capture dif-
ferences in average growth rates across markets. Finally, we also estimate specifica-
tions including the terms in brackets: employer fixed effects, changes in the share of 
enrollees in each plan type, and changes in the average generosity of these plans. 16
Results are presented in columns 1 through 3 of Table 2. There is no significant 
association between concentration levels and premium growth, and the estimates 
change little upon inclusion of additional controls.17 Of course, causality can be 
inferred from this model only if within-market variation in insurer concentration is 
uncorrelated with other unobserved determinants of premiums, and if variation in 
premium growth does not induce variation in concentration. As previously noted, 
14 From a theoretical standpoint, HHI is a valid measure of competition if firms compete à la Cournot. While the 
Cournot model does not accurately describe the health insurance market, we follow the lead of most prior studies in 
the related literature, as well as the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, in adopting the HHI as a measure of competition.
15 Given the inclusion of market fixed effects in equation (1), the coefficients on market-year covariates (includ-
ing HHI) are identified by within-market changes in these variables.
16 Note that employer fixed effects will substantially affect the coefficient on HHI only if employers with high or 
low growth in premiums are systematically located in markets that have high or low levels of HHI.
17 The estimates are similarly small in magnitude and statistically insignificant if we use the change in HHI in place 
of the level of HHI as the key explanatory variable. For the most part, the coefficient estimates on the market-level 
control variables are statistically insignificant. The coefficient estimates on the employer-market controls are highly 
significant and generally have the expected signs. For example, a shift from 100 percent enrollment in POS plans (the 
omitted category) to 100 percent enrollment in HMO plans is associated with a 5 percent decline in premiums.
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there are good reasons to doubt the validity of these assumptions. Hence, in the sec-
tion that follows we pursue an instrumental variables approach.
III. Do Increases in Local Market Concentration Cause Increases in Premiums?
In this section, we estimate the causal effect of changes in market concentration 
on premium growth by exploiting shocks to local market concentration produced 
by mergers and acquisitions (M&A).18 Because M&A activity in local or regional 
markets may itself be motivated by expected trends in premium growth, we consid-
ered only large, nonlocal mergers as candidates for this analysis. We also ruled out 
mergers with insufficient pre or post periods (e.g., Aetna and NYLCare in 1998, the 
18 Our approach is similar in spirit to that of Hastings and Gilbert (2005), who use an acquisition of a West Coast 
refinery as a source of exogenous variation in the degree of vertical integration across retail gasoline markets in 13 
West Coast metropolitan areas. They find that nonintegrated rival stations face higher costs, controlling for several 
time-varying station characteristics.
Table 2—Effect of Consolidation on Premiums (OLS Models) 
(Study Period: 1998–2006)
Dependent variable = annual change in ln(premiums)
(1) (2) (3)
Lagged HHI 0.002 −0.004 −0.005
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
Market-year controls
Lagged ln(Medicare costs per cap) −0.015 −0.020 −0.019
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Lagged unemployment rate 0.118 0.147 0.158*
(0.098) (0.090) (0.092)
Lagged hospital HHI 0.008 −0.003 0.001
(0.016) (0.015) (0.015)
Employer-market controls 
Δ Demographic factor 0.303*** 0.314*** 0.311***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Δ Fraction of self-insured 0.028*** 0.032*** 0.024***
 employees (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Δ Plan design 0.349***
(0.022)
Δ Fraction in indemnity plans 0.085***
(0.006)
Δ Fraction in HMO plans −0.052***
(0.006)
Δ Fraction in PPO plans 0.002
(0.003)
Employer FE No Yes Yes
Observations 66,906 66,906 66,906
Notes: The unit of observation is the employer-market-year. All specifications include mar-
ket and year fixed effects. HHI is scaled from 0 to 1. Standard errors are clustered by market. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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first year for which we have data), few overlapping markets, or very small shares in 
our sample for one of the merging parties (e.g., United Healthcare and MAMSI).
Only one merger remained: the Aetna-Prudential merger of 1999. Postmerger, 
the new firm (known as “Aetna”) was widely reported to be the nation’s largest 
insurer, covering 21 million individuals.19 As we describe in detail below, there was 
substantial overlap in the local market participation of Aetna and Prudential prior to 
the merger, generating the potential for sizable postmerger changes in market con-
centration. Online Appendix 2 provides additional discussion of the circumstances 
surrounding the merger. Importantly, there is no ex ante evidence that Aetna targeted 
Prudential because of expectations about premium growth or changes in insurer 
concentration in affected markets.
Our analysis is subdivided into four sections. First, we estimate the impact of the 
merger on market concentration (the “first stage” analysis). In so doing, we docu-
ment the range of premerger market shares for Aetna and Prudential as well as the 
degree of premerger overlap. Second, we perform a reduced-form analysis, in which 
we examine the impact of the merger on premium growth. Third, we combine these 
analyses to produce our estimate of the causal impact of concentration on premiums. 
Last, we investigate the plausibility of alternative explanations for our findings. In 
particular, we estimate specifications to tease out the reaction of Aetna’s rivals, as 
these responses are informative vis-à-vis the market dynamics.
A. The Effect of the Aetna-Prudential Merger on Market Concentration
Immediately prior to the merger in 1999, Aetna and Prudential were the third 
and fifth largest insurers in our sample in terms of the number of enrollees. All 
139 markets included plans offered by both firms. There was significant variation 
across markets, however, in the premerger shares of each firm. We hypothesize that 
markets served by both firms experienced increases in market concentration imme-
diately following the merger, and that these increases varied by the premerger shares 
of the two merging firms. Specifically, for every market we calculate the “simulated 
change in HHI” (sim ΔHH I m ) as the merger-induced change in market m’s HHI that 
would have occurred from 1999 to 2000 absent any other changes, i.e.,
(2)  sim ΔHH I m =  [Aetna 1999 shar e m + Pru 1999 shar e m ] 2 
 − [ (Aetna 1999 shar e m ) 2 +  (Pru 1999 shar e m ) 2 ]
 = 2 × Aetna 1999 shar e m × Pru 1999 shar e m .
For example, if Aetna and Prudential had market shares of 10 percent each in 1999, 
sim ΔHH I m (scaled by 10,000 as discussed above) would equal 200.
Figure 2 provides detail on the actual distribution of sim ΔHH I m in the 139 LEHID 
markets. There is significant variation in this measure, with 46 largely unaffected 
markets (sim ΔHH I m < 10) and 42 highly affected markets (sim ΔHH I m ≥ 100). 
19 Sanders, “Will the Aetna-Prudential Merger Hurt the Patient?” TIME, June 22, 1999.
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One state in particular stands out for its high levels of sim ΔHH I m : Texas. Five of 
the six markets in Texas have sim ΔHH I m greater than 500. The high degree of over-
lap in Texas provoked action by the Department of Justice. To address the concerns 
raised by the Department, Aetna agreed to divest the Texas-based HMO businesses 
it had acquired from NYLCare in 1998.20 We therefore examine whether the consent 
decree in Texas successfully neutralized the effect of the merger in these markets; 
to the extent it did, markets in Texas can serve as a “placebo” group for the natural 
experiment we study.
We propose to use sim ΔHH I m × pos t t as an instrument for HHI in equation (1), 
where post is an indicator variable for the postmerger years in the sample. To evalu-
ate this instrument, we estimate the following equation using market-year data, ini-
tially excluding observations from Texas:
(3)  HH I mt = α +  λ m +  τ t + β sim ΔHH I m ×  τ t +  ε mt .
20 DOJ alleged that after the merger, Aetna would have a market share for fully insured HMOs of 63 percent 
in Houston, and 42 percent in Dallas. DOJ stated that “The required divestitures … will preserve competition and 
protect consumers from higher prices” and “deny Aetna the ability to unduly depress physician reimbursement 
rates.” See http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/1999/June/263at.htm. Although the allegations pertained to Houston and 
Dallas, because Aetna divested all NYLCare plans in Texas, the consent decree affected the entire state. Source: 
“Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Texas to Purchase NYLCare Texas Operations,” Aetna press release, 9/14/1999, 
http://www.aetna.com/news/1999/pr_19990914.htm.
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Figure 2. Distribution of Simulated Change in HHI Resulting from Aetna-Prudential Merger
Notes: N = 139. HHI is scaled from 0 to 10,000.
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The vectors denoted by  λ m and  τ t represent a full set of market and year fixed 
effects, respectively. By interacting sim ΔHH I m with separate indicators for each 
year (except 1998, the omitted category), this model investigates the possibility that 
trends in market concentration may have been different prior to the merger in mar-
kets differentially impacted by the merger. The estimated coefficients will also help 
to determine the appropriate study period for our analysis. In this and all specifica-
tions including sim HH I m , we use a scale of 0 to 1 for this measure.
Figure 3 graphs the coefficient estimates on the yearly interactions with sim ΔHH I m , 
together with the 95 percent confidence intervals. The sample includes data from 1998 
to 2003. Estimates are presented in numerical form in column 1 of Table 3. Relative 
to the omitted interaction term, sim ΔHH I m × ( year = 1998), only the interactions 
with indicators for 2000 and 2001 are statistically significant. At −0.10, the coeffi-
cient estimate for β in 1999 is small and (insignificantly) negative, whereas estimates 
for β in 2000 and 2001 are large (0.49 and 0.46, respectively) and significant at the 5 
percent level. The timing is consistent with expectations: the merger was effectively 
cleared in July 1999, when the Department of Justice submitted its Proposed Final 
Judgment. The coefficients in 2000 and 2001 are significantly smaller than 1, imply-
ing that employers to some extent substituted away from Aetna and Prudential in the 
wake of the merger. In addition, there is likely attenuation bias due to measurement 
error, as we have only a sample (rather than a census) of insurance contracts.
The coefficient estimates of β in 2002 are 2003 are both noisy and negative indi-
cating that the merger-induced shocks to local concentration dissipated quickly.21 In 
21 This finding is consistent with reports from industry experts. According to a 2004 Health Affairs article by 
Robinson, “[G]ossip speculates [Aetna] would be lucky to still have 30,000 of the 5 million it acquired from Prudential.”
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Figure 3. Estimated Coefficients and 95 percent Confidence Intervals from  
Regression of HHI on Simulated Change in HHI
Note: Coefficients and standard errors are reported in column 1 of Table 3.
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order to use the merger as an instrument for market concentration, we must therefore 
focus our analyses on the early years of our sample: 1998–2001 for the first-stage 
model, and 1998–2002 for the second stage (because HHI impacts premiums with 
a lag). However, in Section IIIB below, we discuss reduced-form analyses of the 
longer-term impact of changes in simulated HHI on health insurance premiums by 
extending the study period out to 2006.
Next, we use data from 1998 through 2001 to estimate a more parsimonious model 
that replaces the individual year interactions with a single “post” indicator that takes 
a value of one during 2000 and 2001:
(4) HH I mt = α +  λ m +  τ t +  β 0 sim ΔHH I m × pos t t 
 + [ β 1 sim ΔHH I m × pos t t × Texa s m ] + [ ψ pos t t × Texa s m ] 
 +  ε mt .
After estimating the baseline model (which excludes the terms in brackets), 
we add the six Texas markets to the sample and include a triple-interaction, 
Table 3—Effect of the Aetna-Prudential Merger on Market Concentration 
(Dependent Variable = HHI )
1998–2003 1998–2001 1998–2001 1998–2001
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sim Δ HHI × (year = 1999) −0.097
(0.180)
Sim Δ HHI × (year = 2000) 0.487**
(0.204)
Sim Δ HHI × (year = 2001) 0.455**
(0.194)
Sim Δ HHI × (year = 2002) −0.017
(0.205)
Sim Δ HHI × (year = 2003) −0.199
(0.248)
Sim Δ HHI × (year >= 2000) 0.520*** 0.512*** 0.520***
(0.166) (0.165) (0.166)
Sim Δ HHI × (year >= 2000) × −0.646*** −1.262***
 (Texas == 1) (0.224) (0.291)
Texas × (year >= 2000) 0.052
(0.037)
Texas included? No No Yes Yes
Observations 798 532 556 556
R2 0.677 0.674 0.677 0.678
Notes: The unit of observation is the market-year. All specifications include market and year fixed effects. HHI is 
scaled from 0 to 1. Standard errors are clustered by market. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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sim ΔHH I m × pos t t × Texa s m , to explore whether the post-merger impact of 
sim ΔHHI differs in these markets. We then add the term pos t t × Texa s m to control 
for average changes in Texas as compared to other states during the post period, 
although it may be difficult to separately identify the coefficient on the two Texas 
interactions because there are only six Texas markets and two post years.
The results are displayed in column 2 of Table 3. As anticipated, the coefficient 
on sim ΔHH I m × pos t t is statistically significant: 0.52, with a standard error of 0.17. 
The results in columns 3 and 4 show that the federal government achieved its objec-
tive of neutralizing the merger’s effect on market concentration in Texas markets. 
The triple-interaction term for Texas markets is negative and statistically significant 
in both specifications and fully offsets the impact of the merger. In both models, 
we cannot reject the hypothesis that the sum of the relevant double- and triple-
interaction terms equals zero. Observations from Texas are therefore suitable for 
the placebo test (or falsification exercise) previously noted. If premium growth has 
a similar relationship with sim ΔHHI in Texas as in other parts of the United States, 
then changes in insurer concentration may not be driving the observed relationship.
B. The Effect of the Aetna-Prudential Merger on Health Insurance Premiums
To investigate the effect of merger-induced increases in local market concentra-
tion on plan premiums, we estimate models of the following form:22
(5) Δ ln ( premium)emt = α + κ0 sim ΔHH I m × postt + ϕXmt−1 + ρΔCemt 
 + τt + λm [ + ςe ][ + ω Δ plan type sharesemt 
 + ϑ Δplan designemt ]
 [ + κ1 sim ΔHH I m × postt × Texasm]
 [ + γ postt × Texasm ] + εemt .
In light of the results from the preceding section, we focus on the period between 1998 
and 2002 (i.e., annual premium growth from 1998–1999, 1999–2000, 2000–2001, 
and 2001–2002). Note that in this model pos t t takes a value of one for the 2000–2001 
and 2001–2002 changes, and is otherwise equal to zero.23 As in the OLS regressions 
presented in Section II, we begin with a parsimonious specification that controls for 
lagged market covariates and changes in employer-market characteristics, as well 
as fixed differences across years and markets in average premium growth (captured 
respectively by year and market fixed effects, denoted  τ t and  λ m ).
The results are reported in column 1 of Table 4. The estimated coefficient on 
sim ΔHH I m × pos t t is positive and statistically significant. Given the mean 
22 In a companion set of specifications (results available upon request), we define the outcome variable to be 
ln(premium) (rather than the change in this measure) and include market time trends. The results are similar to 
those presented in this section.
23 Recall the last year of the merger-induced HHI increase was 2001, and premiums for 2002 are set in 2001.
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sim ΔHH I m of 0.014 (across all 139 geographic markets), the point estimate of 
0.177 implies that, in a typical market, the merger induced an average premium 
increase of approximately 0.25 percent in both 2001 and 2002, and thus a total 
increase of approximately 0.50 percent. The point estimate changes little upon 
inclusion of employer fixed effects (column 2), and as expected the standard 
errors decrease. Adding controls for changes in the generosity of plans (column 3) 
also has little impact on the estimate.
Table 4—Merger Effects on Premiums 
(Study Period: 1998–2002)
Dependent variable = annual change in ln(premiums)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sim Δ HHI × (year >= 2001) 0.177*** 0.202*** 0.186*** 0.193*** 0.188***
(0.056) (0.048) (0.050) (0.049) (0.049)
Sim Δ HHI × (year = 2000) 0.011
(0.061)
Sim Δ HHI × (year = 2001) 0.181**
(0.071)
Sim Δ HHI × (year = 2002) 0.200***
(0.067)
Sim Δ HHI × (year >= 2001) −0.238*** −0.056
 × (Texas = 1) (0.069) (0.191)
(Year >= 2001) × (Texas = 1) 0.016
(0.017)
Market-year controls
Lagged ln(Medicare costs per cap) −0.029 −0.047 −0.039 −0.040 −0.046 −0.048
(0.034) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.033) (0.033)
Lagged unemployment rate 0.479*** 0.579*** 0.567*** 0.570*** 0.575*** 0.535***
(0.174) (0.161) (0.155) (0.155) (0.152) (0.152)
Lagged hospital HHI 0.003 −0.004 0.003 0.003 −0.010 −0.008
(0.022) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Employer-market controls 
Δ Demographic factor 0.304*** 0.328*** 0.323*** 0.323*** 0.324*** 0.324***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Δ Fraction of self-insured 0.048*** 0.054*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.017*** 0.017***
 employees (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Δ Plan design 0.223*** 0.223*** 0.210*** 0.211***
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040)
Δ Fraction in indemnity plans 0.089*** 0.089*** 0.091*** 0.091***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Δ Fraction in HMO plans −0.081*** −0.081*** −0.084*** −0.084***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Δ Fraction in PPO plans 0.000 0.000 −0.001 −0.001
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Employer FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Texas observations included? No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 28,645 28,645 28,645 28,645 30,493 30,493
Notes: The unit of observation is the employer-market-year. All specifications include market and year fixed effects. 
HHI is scaled from 0 to 1. Standard errors are clustered by market. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Next, we study the pattern of premium growth over time by replacing the term 
sim ΔHH I m × pos t t with sim ΔHH I m ×  τ t (interactions with individual year dum-
mies, with 1998 as the omitted year). The results, in column 4, provide two key 
insights. First, there is no evidence of a “pretrend” in premium growth; that is, the 
estimated reaction to the merger is not due to a premerger trend in markets with large 
overlapping Aetna and Prudential market shares. Second, the effect of the merger on 
premium growth is very similar in both “post” years.
This finding strongly suggests that the impact of the merger is appropriately mod-
eled, i.e., that concentration affects the growth rate rather than the level of premi-
ums.24 If the sample is extended to 2006, we find the coefficients remain of similar 
magnitude for two more years, and then fall down close to zero.25 The fact that the 
coefficient estimates remain positive and do not become negative suggests some 
amount of hysteresis: consolidation results in a higher rate of premium growth, and 
even when circumstances change (in this case, the effect of the merger on concentra-
tion eventually disappeared) premiums remain elevated.26
Columns 5 and 6 of Table 4 present the results of the falsification test enabled by 
the divestiture requirement in Texas. To execute this test, we add Texas observations 
to the sample and estimate the full model (as in column 3) with the addition of a 
triple interaction term, sim ΔHH I m × pos t t × Texa s m .27 The estimated coefficient 
on this term is highly significant and negative (−0.24) and almost perfectly offsets 
the main effect of sim ΔHH I m in this specification (0.19). Although the result is 
not robust to including a separate term for pos t t × Texa s m (column 6), this is not 
surprising given there are only six markets in Texas and just two post years. On net, 
the results suggest that the market power effect of the merger in Texas was indeed 
neutralized by the DOJ’s actions.28
C. IV Estimates
Table 5 presents the first-stage, reduced-form, and second-stage models corre-
sponding to our IV estimate; the reduced-form model is repeated from column 3 of 
Table 4. At 0.39, the estimated effect of lagged HHI on premium growth is positive, 
statistically significant, and roughly twice as large as the reduced-form estimate. 
This is anticipated given the first-stage coefficient of 0.48 reported in column 1.29
Because our estimates suggest that changes in HHI affect the growth rate (rather 
than just the level) of premiums, to estimate the average effect of consolidation over 
the entire study period, we must consider the timing of consolidation between 1998 
24 An alternative explanation is that an increase in concentration does raise the level (rather than the growth rate) 
of premiums, but it takes multiple years to reach the new level.
25 To be precise, the coefficients on interactions of the simulated change in HHI with indicators for 2003 and 
2004 are 0.293 and 0.203 respectively, and are both significant with p < 0.01.
26 As noted earlier, the results of the first stage necessitate a study period ending in 2002. However, the results 
just described suggest the estimates will be conservative.
27 Note a second-order interaction (i.e., postt × Texasm) is arguably not necessary in this model as market fixed 
effects already control for differences in average annual growth rates across markets.
28 As an additional extension of the reduced-form analysis, we examined whether the impact of the merger 
was greater in markets with higher initial levels of concentration. Unfortunately, coefficient estimates on 
sim ΔHHIm × postt × initial HHIm (and variants thereof) were very imprecise.
29 Note this first-stage coefficient differs slightly from the coefficient obtained using market-year data, as the unit 
of observation is the employer-market-year.
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and 2006. As previously noted, the average increase in HHI across all markets was 
698 points during this period. If this increase were evenly distributed over time, the 
effect of consolidation on premiums during our study period would be approximately 
13 percent. However, consolidations tended to occur later in the study period, yield-
ing a cumulative estimated effect of approximately 7 percent.30
For the sake of comparison, we also present coefficient estimates obtained using 
OLS models, in which lagged HHI is the predictor of interest. As noted before, 
OLS estimates are likely to be downward biased, understating the actual impact 
of changes in market concentration on premiums. Indeed, the coefficient from 
the OLS model (presented in column 4) is near zero (and imprecisely estimated). 
30 Details of our calculation are available in online Appendix 3. If one assumes that an increase in concentration 
between t and t + 1 affects premium growth for only two years (i.e., until t + 3, rather than indefinitely), then the 
implied increase in premiums caused by the increase in HHI between 1998 and 2006 is somewhat lower at 5 percent.
Table 5—The Impact of HHI on Premiums 
(Study Period: 1998–2002)
Dep var = lagged HHI Dep var = annual change in ln (premium)
First-stage 
estimates
Reduced-form 
estimates
IV 
estimates
OLS 
estimates
Sim Δ HHI × (year >= 2001) 0.475*** 0.186***
(0.014) (0.050)
Lagged HHI 0.391*** 0.015
(0.130) (0.018)
Market-year controls
Lagged ln(medicare costs per cap) 0.034** −0.039 −0.052 −0.018
(0.014) (0.036) (0.037) (0.034)
Lagged unemployment rate 0.204*** 0.567*** 0.488*** 0.474***
(0.048) (0.155) (0.163) (0.162)
Lagged hospital HHI −0.060*** 0.003 0.026 0.006
(0.007) (0.020) (0.022) (0.020)
Employer-market controls 
Δ Demographic factor 0.004*** 0.323*** 0.321*** 0.323***
(0.001) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003)
Δ Fraction of self-insured 0.000 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019***
 employees (0.001) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004)
Δ Plan design 0.019* 0.223*** 0.216*** 0.222***
(0.010) (0.040) (0.028) (0.027)
Δ Fraction in indemnity plans 0.001 0.089*** 0.089*** 0.089***
(0.002) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005)
Δ Fraction in HMO plans −0.003 −0.081*** −0.080*** −0.081***
(0.002) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006)
Δ Fraction in PPO plans 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001
(0.002) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Observations 28,645 28,645 28,645 28,645
Notes: The unit of observation is the employer-market-year. All specifications include employer, market, and year 
fixed effects. HHI is scaled from 0 to 1. Standard errors are clustered by market. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Hausman specification tests reject the null assumption of consistency for this model 
( p < 0.01), underscoring the need for instrumental variables estimation.
Collectively, the results presented in this section show that consolidation does 
result in a “premium on premiums.” We arrive at this conclusion by exploiting argu-
ably exogenous increases in local market concentration caused by the nationwide 
merger between two large insurance firms, Aetna and Prudential. Two key results 
indicate our conclusions are not driven by unobserved factors correlated with the 
pre-merger market shares of Aetna and Prudential. First, there is no evidence that 
concentration or premiums in markets with higher sim ΔHHI were trending differ-
ently before the merger took effect. Second, we find no response in Texas, where the 
merger was effectively blocked by the Department of Justice. These tests support 
the use of sim ΔHH I m as an instrument for lagged HH I m . In online Appendix 4, we 
examine the impact of consolidation on health plan characteristics other than price, 
such as plan design and the share of employees enrolled in HMOs. 31
D. Alternative Explanations
The findings summarized above are consistent with the exercise of market power 
in the wake of consolidation. However, the pattern of results is also consistent with 
alternative explanations, in particular a “mistake” in Aetna’s postmerger pricing 
strategy, and/or increases in insurance quality (and therefore price). In this section, 
we discuss the evidence with regard to these alternative hypotheses.
Our results show that prices increase on average in markets with higher 
sim ΔHH I m . If this price increase is primarily due to actions by Aetna, then Aetna’s 
subsequent loss of market share would suggest the price increase was unsuccessful, 
i.e., they were not able to exercise market power following the merger. On the other 
hand, if competitors followed suit by increasing their prices as well, that would sug-
gest that Aetna’s action softened competition marketwide, implying the presence 
(and exercise) of market power.
To investigate whether Aetna’s competitors increased their premiums in response 
to the merger, we estimate a set of specifications analogous to those in Table 4 for the 
61 percent of employer-markets that were not served by either Aetna or Prudential at 
the time of the merger in 1999. Our point estimates for the coefficient of particular 
interest (κ0 from equation (5)) are similar to the estimates for the full sample, as 
shown in online Appendix 5. This implies that insurers not directly involved in the 
merger responded to the merger-induced change in concentration by raising their 
premiums, which supports the market-power explanation for our findings.
Importantly, when we restrict the sample to employer-markets that were served 
(either partially or fully) by Aetna or Prudential at the time of the merger, our 
estimates for κ0 are approximately twice as large. This suggests that the merged 
entity increased its premiums more than its competitors in markets where Aetna 
and Prudential had significant overlap, which is consistent with the merged entity 
31 Among other results, we find that employers reduced the generosity of plan design. This is consistent with 
efforts by employers to reduce the burden of higher insurance premiums through so-called “benefit buybacks.” We 
emphasize that our premium results do control for changes in plan design. We find a somewhat counterintuitive shift 
away from HMOs; however, we discuss plausible explanations for this pattern in online Appendix 4.
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exercising price leadership and its oligopolistic rivals following. Last, it is notable 
that premiums remained elevated in high-sim ΔHHI markets through at least 2006, 
notwithstanding Aetna’s loss of market share by 2002. This hysteresis in market 
price is again consistent with a new oligopolistic pricing equilibrium facilitated by 
Aetna’s original exercise of market power.
The second alternative explanation, that Aetna raised quality and competitors fol-
lowed its lead, is less amenable to exploration using our data. Conceptually, there 
are at least two reasons to question this hypothesis. First, quality is “lumpy” (e.g., 
enhancing consumer access to claims) and far more difficult to calibrate across 
different markets than price. Second, quality changes take time to implement and 
to communicate to the marketplace, and the impact of the merger on price occurs 
within the first year. These points notwithstanding, quality remains an important 
omitted factor in our analysis.
IV. Evaluating the Effects of Insurer Consolidation on Providers
Thus far, we have examined the impact of market structure in the insurance indus-
try on downstream buyers, specifically of group plans. However, the degree of com-
petition in the insurance industry will also potentially affect upstream suppliers, 
such as health-care providers, pharmaceutical firms, and medical device manufac-
turers. To the extent that suppliers have few outside options, a lack of vigorous 
competition among insurers may lead to monopsonistic practices. Capps (2010) 
reviews the theoretical and practical implications of monopsony in the context of 
health insurance mergers.32
Concern about insurers’ monopsonistic practices has emanated not only from pro-
vider organizations such as the American Medical Association and the American 
Hospital Association but also from state and federal regulatory authorities. In fact, 
the DOJ’s formal complaint regarding the Aetna-Prudential merger alleged that the 
merger “would enable Aetna to exercise monopsony power against physicians, allow-
ing Aetna to depress physicians’ reimbursement rates in Houston and Dallas, likely 
leading to a reduction in quantity or degradation in quality of physicians’ services.”33
In this section, we consider the possibility that consolidation facilitates the exer-
cise of monopsony power by estimating the relationship between our instrument for 
HHI (sim ΔHH I m ) and both the employment (or “quantity”) and average compensa-
tion (or “price”) of health-care personnel (such as physicians and nurses). As in the 
premium analysis, if variation in the impact of the merger on different geographic 
localities can be assumed orthogonal to other determinants of employment and com-
pensation growth, our results can be interpreted as causal estimates of the impact of 
consolidation on these outcomes.
To execute this analysis, we supplemented the LEHID data with the 
Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) survey on income and employment in 
32 A number of recent studies examine the effect of insurer bargaining power on hospital prices, including 
Feldman and Wholey (2001), Sorensen (2003), Moriya, Vogt, and Gaynor (2010), and Ho (2009).
33 See Complaint, united States vs. Aetna Inc. (ND TX, 21 June 1999). More recently, the DOJ required a similar 
divestiture before approving a 2005 merger between United Health Group Inc. and Pacificare Health Systems Inc. 
Both divestitures were driven by concerns about the effect on physician services in specific markets (see Complaint, 
united States vs. unitedHealth Group Inc. and Pacificare Health Systems Inc., Dec 20, 2005).
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health care–related occupations. We restrict our attention to the 43 occupation cat-
egories that are classified under the Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) 
system as “Healthcare Practitioner and Technical Occupations.” These include den-
tists, registered nurses, anesthesiologists, surgeons, and pharmacy technicians. To 
facilitate a comparison of impacts on physicians versus nurses, we pool together 
the eight occupation categories pertaining to physicians and the two for nurses.34 
Nurses are by far the largest group, accounting for 56 percent of personnel in our 
sample; pharmacists are second (4.3 percent), and physicians are a close third (4.2 
percent). Additional details, including descriptive statistics for our sample, are avail-
able in online Appendix 6.
The unit of observation for the OES data (as well as our analysis) is the occupa-
tion-MSA-year and the variables of interest are the mean annual wage and estimated 
employment. Using a crosswalk that matches LEHID markets to MSAs, we merge 
this data with our measures of insurer concentration (including our instrument). We 
estimate parsimonious specifications using the change in log average earnings or 
employment between 1999 and 2002 as the dependent variable, and sim ΔHHI as 
the main predictor:
(6) Δ ln  y os, 99−02 = α + γ sim ΔHH I s + ωPhysicia n o × sim ΔHH I s 
 + ϑ Nurs e o × sim ΔHH I s 
 + ς Physicia n o + θNurs e o + υΔHospitalHH I s 
 + [Δ ln  y os,97−98 +  ς o ] +  ε os .
The subscripts o and s denote occupation and MSA, respectively. Our baseline spec-
ification includes indicators for the physician and nurse occupation categories as 
well as interactions between these indicators and sim ΔHH I s . The indicators capture 
differences in earnings and employment growth for each category (relative to other 
health-care occupations), while the interactions reflect the differential impact of 
insurer consolidation on earnings and employment in these categories. In all speci-
fications, we control for the change in hospital concentration in each market. As 
specification checks, we progressively add each of the terms in brackets. The first 
term, Δ ln  y os, 97−98 , represents the change in earnings or employment between 1997 
and 1998 and serves as a control for preexisting trends in earnings (or employment) 
growth. The second term represents a full set of fixed effects for the 35 occupation 
categories. We necessarily restrict the sample to occupation-markets present in both 
1999 and 2002, and we weight each observation by the average estimated employ-
ment in that occupation-market. Standard errors are robust and clustered by MSA.
34 The categories pooled under “Physicians” are Dentists, Family and General Practitioners, General Internists, 
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, General Pediatricians, Psychiatrists, Podiatrists, and Surgeons. Some of the 
individual physician categories have low estimates for employment and are present in only a handful of markets 
during our study period. The “Nurses” category includes Registered Nurses (RNs) and Licensed Vocational 
Nurses (LVNs).
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The results are presented in Table 6. Columns 1 through 3 pertain to models using 
the change in log average earnings from 1999–2002 as the dependent variable, while 
columns 4–6 use the change in log employment as the dependent variable. The 
coefficient estimate on sim ΔHH I s in columns 1 through 3 is positive but imprecisely 
estimated, implying no significant impact of the merger on average earnings across 
all health-care occupations. The coefficient on the physician indicator in columns 
1 and 2 demonstrates that physicians experienced an increase of around 21 percent 
in average nominal earnings between 1999 and 2002 (relative to nonnursing health-
care personnel). However, the coefficient estimate on Physicia n o × sim ΔHH I s is 
negative and significant in all models, revealing that earnings growth for physicians 
was lower in markets affected by the merger. Given the average value of 0.014 for 
sim ΔHH I s , the point estimate implies that the merger restrained growth in physi-
cian earnings by approximately 3 percent in a typical market. The coefficient on the 
nurse indicator reveals that nurses experienced a small decrease in relative earnings 
over the same time period. However, the interaction term for nurses is positive and 
statistically significant, implying this decrease was offset at least in part in markets 
where Aetna and Prudential had premerger overlap (by approximately 0.6 percent 
in the typical market).
Columns 4 through 6 present estimates from specifications examining the impact 
of the merger on employment. The coefficients are again similar across all models. 
Relative to other health-care occupations, employment of physicians increased, while 
that of nurses decreased, during the study period. The point estimate on sim ΔHH I s is 
negative and significant: in a typical market, the merger led to a drop in health care–
related employment of 2.7 percent. The interaction between the physician indicator 
Table 6—Effect of the Aetna-Prudential Merger on Health-care Provider Earnings and Employment     
Dep var = Δ log (average income) 
from 99–02; mean = 0.121
Dep var = Δ log (employment) 
from 99–02; mean = 0.191
Simulated Δ HHI 0.111 0.078 0.091 −2.372*** −2.723*** −2.437**
(0.180) (0.215) (0.204) (0.809) (0.941) (0.978)
Physician indicator 0.193*** 0.184*** NA 0.523*** 0.497*** NA
(0.034) (0.035) (0.170) (0.167)
Physician × simulated −2.007** −2.180*** −2.195*** −2.507 −2.582 −2.858
 Δ HHI (0.833) (0.801) (0.811) (7.934) (8.441) (8.439)
Nurse indicator −0.013** −0.015** NA −0.154*** −0.160*** NA
(0.006) (0.006) (0.025) (0.027)
Nurse × simulated  0.440** 0.471* 0.457* 1.707** 2.012* 1.738*
 Δ HHI (0.221) (0.257) (0.254) (0.845) (1.071) (1.032)
Δ Hospital HHI, 0.023 0.021 0.024 −0.024 −0.027 −0.067
 1999–2002 (0.029) (0.031) (0.032) (0.254) (0.247) (0.235)
Trend in dep var, 
 1997–1998
No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Occupation fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 2,110 1,631 1,631 2,110 1,631 1,631
Notes: Unit of observation is the occupation-market-year. All physician occupations are combined into one cate-
gory. Specifications are restricted to occupation-markets present in both 1999 and 2002. Simulated HHI is scaled 
from 0 to 1.  Sample does not include observations from Texas. All specifications are weighted by average estimated 
employment in each occupation-market. Standard errors are clustered by market. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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and sim ΔHH I s is negative but noisily estimated, whereas the interaction between 
the nurse indicator and sim ΔHH I s is large, positive, and marginally significant. The 
relative increase in nurse employment in geographic markets differentially affected 
by the merger suggests there was some substitution toward nurses in these markets. 
This explanation is buttressed by the earnings regressions, which found the merger 
depressed growth in physicians’ earnings while modestly boosting nurses’ earnings.35
To summarize, we find that increases in market concentration predicted to occur 
in the wake of the Aetna-Prudential merger resulted in pronounced declines in 
health care–related employment. These declines were smaller for nurses than for 
other occupations on average (including physicians), and nurses also enjoyed wage 
increases relative to other occupations (and physicians in particular).36 The evidence 
suggests that market power facilitates the substitution of nurses for physicians. The 
results are also consistent with the exercise of monopsony power by insurers vis-
à-vis physicians, as their relative earnings and employment growth declined most 
in markets with the largest predicted merger impact. Paired with the findings of 
the previous section, we conclude that in markets where Aetna and Prudential had 
substantial premerger overlap, insurers were able to exercise market power simul-
taneously in input and output markets postmerger. Thus, the premium increases 
documented in the previous section likely understate the increase in insurer profits 
due to consolidation.
V. Discussion and Conclusions
The scope of the private health insurance industry is difficult to overstate. More 
than 170 million nonelderly Americans are privately insured, and this figure does 
not include the millions of publicly insured individuals whose coverage is out-
sourced to private insurers. The recent health insurance reform legislation will 
further expand the reach of this industry, with the Congressional Budget Office pro-
jecting an increase of 16 million in the number with private primary insurance by 
2019 (CBO 2010). In addition, the annual growth in employer-sponsored health 
insurance premiums has exceeded the annual growth in earnings by a factor of seven 
during the last several years (Romer and Duggan 2010).37 In this study, we investi-
gate whether and to what extent increasing consolidation in the US health insurance 
industry is responsible for this rapid growth in premiums.
We arrive at four main conclusions. First, most Americans live in markets served 
by a small number of insurers, and most markets are becoming more concentrated 
over time. We estimate that the fraction of local markets falling under the “highly 
35 As a robustness check, we estimated all models using 1999–2001 as the study period, as the BLS changed its 
methodology for constructing mean wages in 2002 (see online Appendix 6). Our findings are qualitatively similar.
36 We also estimated specifications subdividing the nurse category into two large subgroups (Registered Nurses 
—RNs and Licensed Vocational Nurses—LVNs). We find that only RNs earned higher relative raises in markets 
where the merger had most impact. LVNs enjoyed significant relative employment gains, whereas the employment 
gains for RNs were not statistically significant (although they are of similar magnitude). On the whole, the results 
are consistent with outward shifts of demand for both nursing types, with a less-elastic short-run supply curve for 
RNs. The results from these specifications are presented in online Appendix 6. We thank an anonymous referee for 
this suggestion.
37 Data from the BLS “Employer Costs for Employee Compensation” survey indicate that workers’ real average 
hourly wage and salary income increased by 0.7 percent annually from 2000 to 2009. During that same period, the 
growth rate in ESI premiums was substantially higher at 5.1 percent per year (Romer and Duggan 2010).
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concentrated” category (per the DOJ’s Horizontal Merger Guidelines) increased 
from 68 to 99 percent between 1998 and 2006. Second, premiums are not rising 
more quickly in markets experiencing the greatest increases in concentration, even 
controlling for a rich set of observable plan characteristics.
Third, when we account for the fact that changes in concentration are not orthogo-
nal to other determinants of premium growth, we find that increases in concentration 
do raise premiums. Our instrumental variables estimates, which exploit plausibly 
exogenous shocks to local market structure generated by the 1999 merger of Aetna 
and Prudential, imply that the average market-level changes in HHI between 1998 
and 2006 resulted in a premium increase of approximately 7 percentage points by 
2007, ceteris paribus. Given our sample includes both fully and self-insured plans, 
and insurers have less control over pricing of the latter, it is plausible that consoli-
dation is associated with an even larger impact on fully insured plans, which are 
dominant in the individual and small group markets.
Fourth, we find evidence that consolidation reduces the employment of health-
care workers and may facilitate the substitution of nurses for physicians. Using data 
from the Occupational Employment Statistics survey between 1999 and 2002, we 
find the Aetna-Prudential merger reduced physician earnings in a typical market by 
3 percent and raised nurse earnings by 0.6 percent. The magnitude of this effect was 
higher (lower) in markets where the premerger shares of the two companies over-
lapped more (less). Thus, the results imply that insurers exercised monopsonistic 
power against physicians in some markets during the period 1998–2002.
Our findings indicate that Americans are indeed paying a premium on their health 
insurance premiums as a result of recent increases in market concentration of the 
health insurance industry. However, consolidation explains only a fraction of the steep 
increase in premiums in recent years. While 7 percent is large in absolute terms (it 
translates into approximately $34 billion in extra annual premiums), and large rela-
tive to operating margins of insurers, it is only one-eighth of the increase in average, 
inflation-adjusted premiums observed in our sample during the same 1998 to 2006 
time period.38
We caution that our analysis relies on a single merger whose substantial effects on 
market concentration persisted for just two years. However, it is among the largest 
mergers to date in the health insurance industry, and one with differential impacts 
across 139 geographic markets in the United States (implying 139 small experi-
ments). Additional research that utilizes other plausibly exogenous sources of varia-
tion in market structure would be valuable to assessing conduct in this important 
industry. We also emphasize that our sample consists primarily of large, multisite 
firms, and the results may not be generalizable to all market segments, including 
the small group and individual markets.39 Finally, there has also been a great deal 
of consolidation across (as opposed to within) markets, the effects of which are not 
reflected in our estimates.
38 As shown in Table 1, average premiums in our sample increased from $4,104 in 1998 to $7,832 in 2006. 
Adjusting these both to 2007 dollars yields an increase in average, inflation-adjusted premiums of 54 percent. The 
$34 billion figure is based on an estimated $490 billion in total private insurance premiums in the United States as of 
1998 (CMS 2011). The aggregate effect of consolidation on profits should be larger as the “premium on premiums” 
does not incorporate reductions in provider payments obtained through the exercise of monopsony power.
39 High and increasing concentration has also been documented in the individual/small group market (GAO 2009b).
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